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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: THE ARGERSINGER-
KIRBY DICHOTOMY
INTRODUCTION
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides in pertinent part, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence." To what extent an accused has a right to the "Assis-
tance of Counsel" is still not completely settled. An analytical
survey of the United States Supreme Court cases on this subject
reveals that the right to counsel has developed in an irregular
fashion. The development by the Supreme Court produced two
rights, the right to retained counsel and the right to appointed
counsel. To complicate matters more, the treatment of these two
rights has varied between the federal and state levels. This con-
fusing and somewhat inconsistent "two-level split analysis"' ap-
peared to have been mooted in the past only to reappear as the
Court further interpreted the right to counsel.
Two recent Supreme Court cases, Argersinger v. Hamlin2 and
Kirby v. Illinois,3 brought new clarity to the status of the right to
counsel as a constitutional doctrine. Argersinger represents a
clear confirmation that Gideon v. Wainwright4 was not limited to
the old felony distinction and Kirby represents possibly the final
word on the "critical stage" test in pretrial situations. Obviously
both cases are of considerable import in determining to what
extent an accused has a right to counsel.
These two cases are by no means the "last words on the
subject." It is hoped, however, that in depth examination of these
two cases will serve as a basis for understanding what future
interpretation may be applied to the right to counsel.
1. This term is applied by the author to denote the existence of a four pronged
approach consisting of retained and appointed counsel on the state and federal level. The
significance of this four pronged approach has diminished greatly; however, knowledge of
the existence of this approach and its gradual demise is helpful in understanding the
proper modern analysis in this area.
2. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
3. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
4. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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DEMISE OF THE "SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST
Gideon v. Wainwright5 and Douglas v. California6 were de-
cided on the same day by the United States Supreme Court. They
represent the pivotal point for the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the right to counsel. Any consideration of this constitu-
tional doctrine must use this point as a platform from which to
look into the past and the future. On that day, the two-level split
analysis mentioned earlier appeared to have ended; however, this
observation did not stand the test of further interpretation.
The two-level split analysis actually began with Powell v.
Alabama.7 This case involved a challenge to a state court which
failed to allow the defendants an opportunity to obtain their own
counsel in a capital case. The Supreme Court articulated the
issue as whether the denial of the assistance of counsel contrav-
enes the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' In
holding that denial of the assistance of counsel under the circum-
stances contravenes the concept of due process, the Court quoted
the following:
"It is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded
by the first eight Amendments against national action may also
be safeguarded against state action because the denial of them
would be the denial of due process of law. If this is so, it is not
because those rights are enumerated in the first eight
Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that they
are included in the conception of due process of law."9
This form of analysis resulted in the right to counsel in state
cases being decided under a different standard than the federal
cases. This decision took notice of the difference between the
right to appointed counsel and the right to retained counsel. The
Court said in a capital case the failure to appoint counsel for an
indigent was a denial of due process. The case of Johnson v.
5. Id.
6. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
7. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
8. This case also indicates that the right to counsel means a right to effective counsel.
The state court had designated "all the members of the bar" as appointed counsel for the
defendants. The Supreme Court found this appointment so indefinite as to amount to a
denial of effective counsel.
9. 287 U.S. at 67, quoting from Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908). The
reasoning seemed to be that the right to be heard which is protected by due process would
be of little aid to a defendant without a concurrent right to counsel.
19731
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Zerbst" completed the development of the two-level split analy-
sis. This was a federal court case, thus requiring the Court's anal-
ysis to be focused on the sixth amendment. This Court formu-
lated a test whereby the trial court was required to provide coun-
sel for an accused" who was unable to obtain it, who did not
intelligently waive it, and whose life and liberty was at stake.
Johnson involved a felony but there is no language to indicate the
Court intended to use that as a point of classification.
After Johnson 2 there were clearly four different rights to
counsel. In the federal courts there was the right to retained coun-
sel and the right to appointed counsel. There were also the same
two rights in the state courts. At this point the status of the right
to counsel was that at the trial itself there is an absolute right to
retained counsel in both federal and state courts. 3 The right to
appointed counsel in federal courts at the trial was absolute, in
light of Johnson.4 The right to appointed counsel in state courts
at the trial was in need of further clarification.
Powell had indicated that due process required the appoint-
ment of counsel before trial in capital cases, but beyond that
narrow situation the status of the right remained uncertain.
The clarification of the right to appointed counsel for non-
capital state cases began with Betts v. Brady.1 5 The Court said
that the fourteenth amendment did not require the appointment
of counsel in every non-capital state case. While examining the
history of the right to counsel and finding that it was not a funda-
mental right, essential to a fair trial, the Court stated:
10. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
11. The Court spoke in terms of the constitutional deprivation divesting the trial
court of jurisdiction:
If the accused . . . is not represented by counsel and has not completely and
intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a
jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or
his liberty.
304 U.S. at 468.
12. There was some doubt after Johnson as to the scope of the holding. There was a
tendency among the courts to imply a waiver of counsel from a defendant who pleaded
guilty without asking for one. Since the case of Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941),
the rule has been that waiver of counsel at pleading must be explicit and intelligent.
13. If there was any doubt about the absolute right to retained counsel in state courts
after Powell, the case of Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954), should have dispelled that
doubt. The Court in this case stamped the right of retained counsel as unqualified.
14. The felony limitation that beset the interpretation of Gideon never seemed to
arise in the interpretation of Johnson.
15. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
[Vol. 25
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[T]he Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and
incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the common and
fundamental ideas of fairness and right, and while want of coun-
sel in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking in such
fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the amendment em-
bodies an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or
in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a
defendant who is not represented by counsel.'6
The application of the concept of due process and its pre-Gideon
interpretation of fundamental fairness gave rise to a "special cir-
cumstances" test. After Betts and its companion case of Bute v.
Illinois,'7 the holding in Powell was restricted to capital crime
cases and to those instances where the defendant was incapable
of making an adequate defense due to age, ignorance, or intellec-
tual limitations. For more than twenty years after Betts the
courts occupied themselves with case by case determination of
what constituted the "special circumstances"1 8 that would re-
quire the appointment of counsel in non-capital state cases. By
the time the Court handed down Gideon, there was very little
remaining of the Betts rule.
Gideon involved a factual situation very similar to Betts.'9
The Court accepted the Betts assumption that a provision of the
Bill of Rights that is fundamental and essential to a fair trial is
made obligatory upon the States by the fourteenth amendment;
however, the Court disagreed with the Betts conclusion that the
right to counsel was not one of those fundamental rights. The
Court regarded Betts as an anomaly in the development of the
right to counsel. While noting this break with precedent extend-
ing from Powell,2" the Court in Gideon said:
16. 316 U.S.- at 473.
17. 333 U.S. 649 (1948).
18. The Court found "special circumstances" in a variety of situations, e.g. Chewning
v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962). This was the last of the Betts rule cases to reach
the Court before Gideon (complexity and variety of the defenses). McNeal v. Culver, 365
U.S. 109 (1962) (accused was ignorant and mentally ill); Hudson v. North Carolina, 363
U.S. 697 (1960) (accused was an 18-year-old with a sixth grade education); Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (misinformation that might have been prevented by counsel
was placed in the court record); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945); Williams v.
Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945) (both cases found special circumstances in the nature of the
criminal charge).
19. Mr. Gideon, like Mr. Betts, did a credible job of defending himself. Therefore,
viewed in the light of Betts, the Court was unable to fit Gideon under the "special
circumstances" test.
20. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, said,
1973]
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Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require
us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice,
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him.2
This decision incorporated the sixth amendment into the four-
teenth amendment. Before Gideon there were two different ana-
lytical approaches involving the right to appointed counsel. After
Gideon" it was assumed the tests merged until later interpreta-
tion showed that this conclusion was premature.
Douglas v. California,z although decided on the same day as
Gideon, took a different analytical approach to a similar problem.
This case involved an equal protection attack on the denial of the
right to counsel to indigents unless a court made a prior determi-
nation of the merit of the appeal. 24 The Court looked to the "sus-
pect classification" 25 created by this unequal treatment of indi-
gents as unjustified by any state interest.
The fact is that in deciding as it did-that "appointment of counsel is not a
fundamental right, essential to a fair trial"-the Court in Betts v. Brady made
an abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents.
372 U.S. at 343.
21. Id. at 344. Is our system of criminal justice really adversarial? See Blumberg,
Covert Contingencies in the Right to the Assistance of Counsel, 21 VAND. L. Rav. 581
(1967). Mr. Blumberg feels that the Supreme Court is too idealistic in its confidence in
the protection provided by the assistance of counsel. He noted that the Court's opinions
should take cognizance of the following realities. Firstly, the informal structure of the
courts is characterized by bureaucratic goals other than the formal traditional goal of due
process. Secondly, there are certain realities of the relationship between the defense law-
yer and the other professionals in the court organization which bear on the lawyer-client
relationship in the criminal court when appointed counsel is involved. These factors
militate against the adversarial character which the Court finds so necessary in our system
of justice.
22. Note that in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court perceived no
relevant difference between the sources of the right to counsel.
Denial of counsel to the indigent at the time of interrogation while allowing an
attorney to those who can afford one would be no more supportable by reason
or logic than the similar situation at trial and on appeal struck down in Gideon
and Douglas.
Id. at 472-73.
23. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
24. This was an appeal granted as a matter of right in state court. This Court left
open the question of a discretionary appeal in state courts. The Court, using a sixth
amendment analysis, had already determined that there was a right to appointed counsel
for appeals in federal court. See Ellis v. U.S., 356 U.S. 674 (1957); Johnson v. U.S., 352
U.S. 565 (1956).
25. In the earlier case of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), the Court recognized
that classifications based on economic status were suspect, thus shifting the burden of
justifying the discrimination to the State. 5
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In the light of Douglas why did the Court in Gideon avoid the
obvious equal protection argument in favor of incorporating the
sixth amendment to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment? By comparing the protection available to the average per-
son with that available to an indigent, the Court could have relied
on Powell to hold that where counsel would be available to the
one, it must be supplied to the other. With this analysis the Court
could have effectively overruled Betts and its progeny without
attacking the wisdom of the court that decided the case. Although
the factual analysis of the sixth amendment and the equal protec-
tion basis as to a right to counsel overlap, the equality approach
brings a new perspective to bear on the analysis of this right. The
recognition of governmental discrimination against the poor as an
independent constitutional violation, unlike traditional sixth
amendment analysis, puts the burden of justification on those
who would continue economic discrimination against the misde-
meanant. The incorporation approach of Gideon involved the
expansion of the concept of the right to counsel while an equal
protection attack would have required a justification of the right
to counsel's containment short of equality.
Another perplexing question about Gideon is why it was con-
strued non-expansively until recently?26 The facts in Gideon in-
volved the denial of counsel to an indigent felon as did the facts
in Johnson v. Zerbst,2 but the holding in Johnson has not been
limited to felonies. The same is true of Mapp v. Ohio.21 Mapp
involved a felony but no one has suggested that the fourth
amendment-exclusionary rule be limited to felony cases. Before
the restrictive interpretation of Gideon began, it appeared that
Gideon and Douglas considered together required counsel to be
appointed anytime there was a right to retained counsel. This
interpretation coupled with Gideon's incorporation of the sixth
amendment into the fourteenth amendment, which seems to de-
stroy the federal-state distinction, appeared to be the end of the
two-level split analysis referred to earlier.
26. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
27. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). This case involved the right to counsel in federal courts.
28. Although there are definitely analytical differences between the fourth amend-
ment issue involved in Mapp and the sixth amendment right to counsel, there appears to
be no analytical reason for drawing felony-misdemeanor distinctions in one and not the
other.
1973]
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The state courts29 have limited Gideon to felonies despite the
presence of broad language in the opinion. 0 Unfortunately their
guidance came from the Supreme Court in post-Gideon decisions.
In Patterson v. Warren" the Court indicated that the length of
sentence might be the proper test under Gideon. The Court sealed
the felony interpretation of Gideon when it denied certiorari in
Winters v. Beck" and DeJoseph v. Connecticut,3 two cases in
which the state courts had refused to apply Gideon to misde-
meanor prosecutions. 4 In the later landmark cases of Mempa v.
Rhay3 and In re Gault" the Court used language that tended to
limit Gideon to felonies.37 Thus, what at first appeared to be an
egalitarian move that merged the right to appointed counsel with
the right to retained counsel was later interpreted as limiting the
right to appointed counsel to felony cases.
THE "CRITICAL STAGE" TEST
The analysis up to this point has focused on the development
of the right to counsel in the courtroom setting. There is a collat-
29. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970); Burrage v. Superior Court,
105 Ariz. 53, 459 P.2d 313 (1969); People v. Dupree, 42 Ill. 2d 249, 246 N.E.2d 281 (1969);
Hendrix v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash. 2d 142, 456 P.2d 696, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948
(1969); Plutshack v. Dept. of Health and Social Services, 37 Wis. 2d 713, 155 N.W.2d 549
(1968).
30. "[A]ny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." 372 U.S. at 344.
31. 372 U.S. 776 (1963). This decision applied Gideon to misdemeanors that were
punishable by felony length terms of imprisonment.
32. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
33. 378 U.S. 478 (1963).
34. Many of the decisions found the basis for their analysis in Mr. Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Gideon. In that case he said:
The special circumstances rule has been formally abandoned in capital cases
and the time has now come when it should be similarly abandoned in non-
capital cases, at least as to offenses which ...carry the possibility of a
substantial prison sentence.
372 U.S. at 351.
35. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
36. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
37. In Mempa the Coirt said: "In Gideon v. Wainwright . . .this court held that
there was an absolute right to appointment of counsel in felony cases." 389 U.S. at 134.
In Gault the Court said: "A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found
'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness
to a felony prosecution. 387 U.S. at 36. The Court then relied on Gideon in finding a right
to counsel in this situation.
7
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eral approach that is also a necessary prelude to understanding
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the right to counsel. The
stage of the criminal proceeding when a right to counsel arises is
the concern of this analysis. After Gideon it was very clear that
there was a right to counsel, retained or appointed, at the trial
in federal or state court except for non-felony state cases. In that
particular situation, there was an absolute right to retained coun-
sel but no right to appointed counsel. But beyond the actual trial,
the stages that were considered part of the criminal proceeding
so as to invoke the already defined right to counsel were not
analytically connected to the distinction between the right to
retained or appointed counsel; however, an examination of the
"critical stage" test seems to reveal a logical consistency with the
old Betts test.
In Hamilton v. Alabama," the Supreme Court devised the
"critical stage-substantial rights test" that is still the standard
for defining the stage of a criminal proceeding that gives rise to
the right to counsel. This case involved a capital crime when the
defendant was not represented by counsel at the arraignment. In
holding that arraignment under Alabama law is a critical stage
in a criminal proceeding, the Court said:
What happens there may affect the whole trial. Available defen-
ses may be irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted
... . Only the presence of counsel could have enabled this
accused to know all the defenses available and plead intelli-
gently. 
3 9
Hamilton was decided under the reign of Betts; therefore, the
"critical stage" test was born under the "special circumstances"
analysis of Betts. The concept of special circumstances was no
more than a semantic tag for a specialized fundamental fairness
test that has long been the heart of the Supreme Court's approach
to due process problems. Gideon, in overruling Betts, did no more
than move the consideration of the right to counsel for indigents
from a fundamental fairness test to a test that looks to the sixth
amendment for guidance. Thus, there was no analytical reason
that Gideon should destroy the "critical stage" test of Hamilton.
Any conjecture that Gideon had that effect was destroyed when
38. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
39. Id. at 54-55.
1973]
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the Court, using the Hamilton reasoning, rendered the post-
Gideon decision of White v. Maryland.0 The Court reversed the
conviction of a defendant whose uncounseled plea of guilty given
at arraignment, but later changed on advice of counsel, was intro-
duced into his trial as evidence.' After this decision, the term
"critical stage" became a semantic tag for the concept of deter-
mining the point at which a preliminary phase of the trial be-
comes part of the criminal prosecution in the sixth amendment.
The exact application of this "critical stage" analysis has
been the subject of several cases. In Massiah v. U.S.,42 a federal
case involving a conviction for violating federal narcotic laws, the
Court held that a statement surreptitiously obtained from the
defendant after indictment and without presence of counsel is
inadmissible as evidence. Although the Court cited Hamilton and
White, the critical stage analysis was not clearly articulated in
the opinion. The use of this analysis was, however, implicit in the
result of the case.13 The issue of right to counsel was intertwined
with the right against self incrimination, resulting in clouding the
analysis directed at the right to counsel.
Two landmark cases that involved an extension of the analy-
sis used in Massiah are Escobedo v. Illinois" and Miranda v.
Arizona."5 In Escobedo, the critical question was whether the re-
fusal by the police to allow a defendant to consult with his counsel
during the course of an interrogation constituted a denial of the
assistance of counsel. 6 The Court drew upon the rationale of
Hamilton and Massiah in holding that the right to counsel was
guaranteed when the accused prior to arraignment was subjected
to "focused" interrogations.17 In explaining the holding that this
40. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
41. The Court noted that under the Hamilton rationale, the defendant did not have
to show that the evidence was prejudicial.
42. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
43. The Court said:
We hold that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of the [sixth
amendment] guarantee when there was used against him at his trial evidence
of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited
from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of counsel.
Id. at 206.
44. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
45. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
46. The real right protected by Escobedo is the right against self-incrimination; how-
ever, the danger that was posed to that right by the police interrogation was the major
element in determining the "criticalness" of this stage.
47. The Court said:
[Vol. 25
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"focused" interrogation was a critical stage, the Court quoted the
following:
"[T]he right to use counsel at the formal trial [would be] a
very hollow thing [if], for all practical purposes, the conviction
is already assured by pre-trial examination."4
Any confusion concerning the criticalness of police interrogation
was vitiated by Miranda.9 This case set forth a test to determine
the voluntariness of a confession." Part of the test required that
an accused be informed of his right to retained or appointed coun-
sel. Miranda extended the right to counsel that was implied by
Escobedo. The Court in Miranda held that the right to counsel
during the critical stage of police interrogation comprehends not
only the right to consult counsel prior to investigation but also to
have counsel present during any questioning." Both Escobedo
and Miranda involved an extension of Massiah beyond the pre-
indictment, post-indictment analysis. This resulted in a rejection
of the theory that the "critical stage" test should be a mechanis-
tic test that relies on distinctions between pre-indictment and
post-indictment restrictions on police activity.
The Court has found critical stages in other pre-trial police
activity. The companion cases of U.S. v. Wade 2 and Gilbert v.
California3 extended the critical stage to pre-trial line-ups.
Wade54 involved a challenge to a police line-up when the defen-
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
[and] the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to con-
sult with his lawyer ... the accused has been denied "the Assistance of Coun-
sel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment ....
378 U.S. at 490-91.
48. Id. at 487, quoting from In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 344 (1957) (dissent of Black,
J.).
49. Both Escobedo and Miranda have implications much broader than the scope of
this paper. This is especially true of Miranda. These cases are considered here only for
the purpose of developing the "critical stage" test.
50. Admittedly, Miranda may not stand for this proposition in light of cases like
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); however, that is another topic of sufficient depth
to warrant more space than is available. This generalization about Miranda does no
violence to the analysis of the right to counsel in this note.
51. This case, like other cases involving right to counsel, was concerned with waiver
of counsel. The cases and analysis involved in the waiver of counsel are beyond the defined
scope of this paper; therefore, no more than a mere mentioning of the problem would be
appropriate.
52. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
53. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
54. The "critical stage" analysis is not clouded by the self-incriminating issue that
permeated Escobedo and Miranda. The Court in Wade held that a line-up was definitely
not self-incrimination, citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
1973]
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dant was unaided by counsel. The Court held that the post-
indictment was a critical stage of the prosecution at which the
defendant was as much entitled to the aid of counsel as he was
at the trial itself. In tracing the development of the right to coun-
sel in its analysis, the Court in Wade noted that the framers of
the Bill of Rights intended for the right to counsel to be a broad
rule and that "in recognition of the realities of modern criminal
prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth Amendment
guarantees to apply to critical stages of the proceedings.
55
The critical stage analysis of Escobedo and Miranda was relied
on very heavily in Wade. The fact that these cases involved a
stage much earlier in the progression of a criminal prosecution
than Wade probably explains the Court's reliance. The interest
of protecting the accused's right against self-incrimination was
not present in Wade; however, the Court said:
Nothing decided or said in [Escobedo and Miranda] links the
right to counsel only to protection of Fifth Amendment rights.
Rather those decisions no more than reflect a constitutional
principle established as long ago as Powell v. Alabama .... 11
The interest that Wade sought to protect is the adversary theory
of criminal prosecutions. The presence of counsel at all critical
stages is necessary to assure that the accused's interests that are
consistent with the adversary theory are protected. The Court
interpreted the principle arising from Powell and its progeny as
a test requiring scrutinization of any pre-trial confrontation of the
accused by the State to determine whether the presence of coun-
sel was necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair
trial. 7 In Wade the witness saw the accused in the hallway before
the line-up began. The Court was obviously impressed by the
prejudicial effect this could have had on the witness's judgment.
Lawyerly functions that could be performed by counsel are neces-
55. 388 U.S. at 224.
56. Id. at 226.
57. The main threat to a fair trial in this situation is the untrustworthiness of eyewit-
ness identifications. The problems inherent in a forced confrontation were noted by the
Court. These problems included: (1) The danger of suggestiveness being created intention-
ally or unintentionally in many subtle ways, (2) once a witness has picked the accused at
the line.up, he is not likely to change his mind, (3) the understandable outrage of a victim
may excite vengeful motives, and (4) improprieties in the administration of the confronta-
tion would go unnoticed by the defendant.
[Vol. 25
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sary before a stage can be defined as critical. The Court noted
that the accused's counsel could perform the function of protect-
ing the accused from an unfair confrontation by observing the
administration of the line-up.- The right to counsel is not a per-
functory protection; therefore, if there are no lawyerly functions
to be performed by counsel, the stage is not critical. This princi-
ple is graphically illustrated by the Court's decision in Gilbert v.
California.59 Argued at the same time as Wade, this case had a
few additional elements not present in Wade. One of these ele-
ments was a challenge to the taking of handwriting samples from
the defendant without the presence of counsel. The Court distin-
guished the taking of handwriting samples from the line-up situa-
tions by noting that because of the exactness of the science in-
volved in the former, there are no lawyerly functions to be per-
formed by counsel." The line-up in Gilbert involved a situation
more unfair than the Wade situation.' There were more than 100
witnesses of crimes allegedly-committed by Gilbert present at the
line-up. The prejudicial effect of this group identification is ob-
vious. The Court, using the same analysis as it did in Wade,
concluded that any identifications based on that line-up were
inadmissible. In Stovall v. Denno,6 2 the Court held that a face to
face confrontation between an accused and a mortally wounded
witness is not violative of due process. The Court looked to a
fundamental fairness and totality of the circumstances test rather
than applying the "critical stage" analysis.13 The real importance
58. Even if counsel is not provided at these confrontations, a per se exclusionary rule
is not applied if as in Wade the admissibility of the evidence of the line-up identification
itself is not involved. Usually, the witness makes a courtroom identification of the defen-
dant. The Court set forth certain factors that must be considered before deciding if the
courtroom identification is tainted by a line-up unattended by counsel. These factors are
(a) prior opportunity to have observed the alleged criminal act, (b) discrepancy between
any pre-lineup description and the defendant's actual description, (c) identification by
picture before the line-up, (d) failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and
(e) the lapse of time between the alleged act and the line-up identification.
59. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
60. Mr. Justice Black would have held the taking of a handwriting sample as a
critical stage in the criminal prosecution; however, he did not enumerate the lawyerly
functions that could be performed by counsel at this stage.
61. The prejudicial elements in both cases could have been prevented had counsel
been present.
62. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
63. The limitation on the analysis was probably because the Court wanted to avoid
making the Wade-Gilbert rule retroactive for reasons related to the practical administra-
tion of the rule.
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of this case was not in its analysis, but in the Court's refusal to
make the Wade-Gilbert rule retroactive.
Although it was clear that the Court regarded most post-
indictment, pre-trial stages as being as critical as the trial itself,
the Court used Coleman v. Alabama64 to clarify the right to coun-
sel in one pre-indictment situation. The factual situation was
similar to the case65 in which the Court formulated the "critical
stage" test. In holding that the preliminary hearing prior to in-
dictment is a critical stage of the prosecution, the Court in
Coleman looked to the broad language in Wade concerning any
pre-trial confrontation. The existence of certain lawyerly func-
tions6" was determinative on the "critical stage" issue." The
Court refused to limit the "critical stage" analysis to a mechanis-
tic post-indictment approach.
The Court has been inclined to extend the "critical stage"
analysis beyond the end of the formal trial also. In Mempa v.
Rhay0 the Court held that probation revocation or deferred sent-
encing proceedings are critical stages of the criminal prosecution.
The Court noted that Gideon overruled the "special circumstan-
ces" test of Betts by holding that appointment of counsel for an
indigent is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where
substantial rights of the accused may be affected. Gideon's
holding coupled with the 1948 decision of Townsend v. Burke,
7
was enough to convince the Court that there is a right to counsel
at sentencing. The State's allegation that the probation revoca-
tion proceeding was a mere formality was rejected by the Court.
64. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
65. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
66. The lawyerly functions to be provided by counsel at the preliminary hearing are:
(a) To provide the guiding hand in protecting the defendant against an erroneous or
improper prosecution, (b) to fashion a vital impeachment tool for use on cross-
examination, (c) to preserve favorable testimony, (d) to use the hearing as a discovery
device, and (e) to make such arguments as bail, early psychiatric exam et cetera.
67. In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice White expressed his concern that the test as
applied by the majority was too broad. He analogized the preliminary hearing to other
stages like grand jury hearings et cetera in an attempt to show the expansiveness of the
test. 388 U.S. at 250.
68. Denial of the right to counsel at a preliminary hearing is remedied by the Court
in granting a new trial. In light of the valuable lawyerly functions involved at a prelimi-
nary hearing, the proper remedy would seem to require a new preliminary hearing in
addition to a new trial.
69. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
70. 334 U.S. 736 (1948). This case illustrates the critical nature of the sentencing
process in a criminal proceeding.
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Although this expansion of the right to counsel was at the oppos-
ite end of the criminal prosecution, the Court's holding in Mempa
was a logical extension of the analysis of White, Escobedo, and
Miranda.
A COMPARISON
The "critical stage" analysis was born out of an attempt to
apply the right to counsel in situations where there was some
doubt about when the criminal prosecution began. It is a func-
tional approach to the problem. Under this analysis the right to
counsel is extended to any stage of the criminal prosecution that
actually affects a defendant's rights. As the cases discussed ear-
lier clearly show, the Court has required the presence of two ele-
ments before a stage has been considered critical. First, the Court
looks to the inherent nature of the stage itself. If the Court deter-
mines that the proceedings will have a lasting effect on the out-
come of the case, the first element of the formula is satisfied.
Second, the Court determines if the presence of a lawyer would
serve to mitigate or avoid potential prejudice. This determination
entails examining the lawyerly functions that can be performed
by counsel at this stage.
Although the past use of the "critical stage" test has been for
purposes different from the "special circumstances" test, the
analysis involved is not entirely divorced from the old Betts
"special circumstances" analysis." The "special circumstances"
test involved examining the particular individual and the nature
of the proceeding in determining whether there was a right to
counsel. The "critical stage" test is concerned with the nature of
the proceeding. Thus we might say that Gideon only destroyed
the consideration of the individual part of the "special circum-
stances" test. These two tests are not commonly thought of as
analytically connected. One reason is that functionally the two
tests have been used for different purposes. The "critical stage"
test has been used to determine the existence of a right to counsel
in general. The "special circumstances" test, before its demise,
was used to determine the existence of a right to appointed coun-
sel where there was already a right to retained counsel. The most
obvious reason for the lack of comparison is that the "special
71. Note 14 supra.
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circumstances" test was a due process test formulated before the
incorporation of the sixth amendment into the fourteenth amend-
ment. Gideon seemed to destroy the need for such a test; but at
the same time Gideon laid the groundwork for the "critical stage"
test when the Court talked in terms of a right to counsel at every
stage of the criminal proceeding where substantial rights of the
accused may be involved. This reasoning gives the implication of
a "critical stage" test in its early form. Thus despite its due
process origins, the part of the "special circumstances" test that
factually survived Gideon does have an interrelationship with the
"critical stage" test. Another reason for the failure to notice an
interrelationship may be that the factual settings that were adju-
dicated under the Betts test involved trial proceedings that long
have been considered critical stages by the courts. The "critical
stage" test has been used to expand the horizons of the right to
counsel into disputed areas beyond the confines of the actual trial
proceeding. Only when one observes the purposes of both tests
does the interrelationship become apparent. Although this com-
parison of tests seemed academic a few years ago, recent develop-
ments by the Supreme Court have given these observations a
potential future practicality. The expansive quality of the "criti-
cal stage" test caused this form of analysis to be regarded as a
vehicle that would continue to expand the right to counsel to
peripheral areas of criminal prosecutions. The Court in Kirby v.
Illinois72 seems to have frozen the "critical stage" test in its
tracks.
A NEW CRITICAL STAGE TEST?
Kirby, a five to four decision,7 3 involved a police station
show-up that took place after the petitioner's arrest but before he
had been indicted or formally charged with any criminal offense.
The Court held that this was not a stage of the criminal prosecu-
tion at which the petitioner had a right to counsel. 74 The Wade-
72. 406 U.S. 682, 92 S. Ct. 1877 (1972).
73. The majority consisted of Mr. Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, Rhenquist,
and Mr. Chief Justice Burger. The dissenters were Mr. Justices Douglas, Brennan, White,
and Marshall. A close reading of the individual opinions indicates that Kirby cannot
actually be characterized as plurality decision.
74. Mr. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, refined the question to whether
it was constitutional error to admit the victim's testimony that he had identified the
petitioner at the pre-trial stationhouse show-up. 92 S. Ct. at 1883.
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Gilbert rule was held inapplicable in this situation.75 The peti-
tioner was identified by the witness while the petitioner was
seated at a table in the police station. The factual situation in
Kirby is different from Wade or Gilbert in two respects, 6 Firstly,
Wade and Gilbert involved post-indictment line-ups and Kirby
involved a pre-indictment situation. Secondly, Wade and Gilbert
involved formal line-ups while Kirby involved an informal show-
up. The Court seemed very impressed with the first factor but
hardly took note of the second factor. This different priority is
understandable since the pre-indictment distinction was the
basis for the Court's decision while the nature of the informal
show-up militated against the Court's final decision. In a step-by-
step analysis, the Court looked to Wade only on a selective basis.
Concerning the argument that the show-up was self-
incrimination, the Court looked to Wade's holding that a line-up
in no way involved self-incrimination. However, this logic does
not seem to justify distinguishing Miranda as being analytically
different from Wade, thus negating the complimentary effect of
the pre-indictment analysis in Miranda.71 The Court, however,
did distinguish Miranda from Wade-Gilbert because to do other-
wise would have mandated a contra decision in Kirby. By exclud-
ing Miranda and Escobedo the Court was able to point to strong
precedent for post-indictment right to counsel, but none as to the
pre-indictment right. This analysis enabled the Court to opt for
a mechanistic test78 that is very predictable in its application, but
75. Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, felt that to apply the Wade-Gilbert
rule in this situation would be an unwarranted extension of the right to counsel.
76. In his dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Brennan said he felt that Wade and Gilbert
were controlling because the Court in Wade said: "[Tihe assistance of counsel at the line-
up was indispensable to protect Wade's most basic criminal right as a defendant-his
right to a fair trial at which the witness might be more meaningfully cross-examined."
U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 223-24. This same reasoning would seem to be applicable in
the Kirby situation.
77. Mr. Justice Brennan felt very strongly that Miranda and Escobedo were appli-
cable in this case. These decisions, according to Brennan's opinion in Wade, reflect the
constitutional principle that:
[I]n addition to counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he
need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal
or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the
accused's right to a fair trial.
Id. at 226.
78. The formalism of this approach was also assailed by Justice Brennan. In criticiz-
ing the Court's decision to draw a distinct line at the point where the proceeding starts,
he said:
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very limiting in its scope.79 The holding in Kirby has turned the
"critical stage" test inward, thus negating its future effect on the
expansion of the right to counsel. The Court cautioned that this
test did not leave the accused unprotected prior to indictment.
Any activity violative of due process would still be unconstitu-
tional in the pre-indictment setting. 0 This test is not likely to
give rise to a right to counsel in pre-indictment situations. Only
the basics of fairness will be required under this new standard.
The shift in analysis involved in Kirby represented a change
in position by the Court on the issue of at what stage the right to
counsel arises. Another recent case in the right to counsel area,
Argersinger v. Hamlin,' represented a long awaited extension of
Gideon. The early promise of Gideon followed by its dishearten-
ing limitations was discussed earlier. Argersinger restored most of
the early expectations that had been placed in Gideon by holding
that no person can be imprisoned for any offense unless he was
represented at his trial by counsel. The right to counsel can, of
course, be knowingly and intelligently waived.
REVITALIZATION OF GIDEON
Argersinger came to the Supreme Court on a writ of certior-
ari from the Florida Supreme Court,82 which had limited the right
to counsel by analogizing to the limitation placed on the right to
jury trial by Duncan v. Louisiana.3 Duncan limited the sixth
amendment right to jury trial to felonies (cases involving impris-
A post-arrest confrontation for identification is not "a mere preparatory step in
the gathering of the prosecution's evidence." A primary, and frequently sole,
purpose of the confrontation for identification at that stage is to accumulate
proof to buttress the conclusion of the police that they have the offender in hand.
92 S. Ct. at 1887 (citations omitted).
79. Note that the triggering event in the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is
the arrest, not the indictment. See U.S. v. Marion, 406 U.S. 307 (1972).
80. The pre-indictment protection is procedural due process and the test applied in
this situation is a fundamental fairness standard. Remember that the old Betts standard
of special circumstances was a species of the "fundamental fairness" test. Query, could it
be that the pre-indictment protections have now evolved from what was assumed to be a
"critical stage" test prior to Kirby into a test closely related to the supposedly defunct
"special circumstances" rule?
81. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Argersinger was foreshadowed by the Circuit Court case of
James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969).
82. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970).
83. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
[Vol. 25
17
Arnold: The  Right to Counsel: The Argersinger-Kirby Dichotomy
Published by Scholar Commons, 1973
1973] RIGHT TO COUNSEL
onment for more than six months). Since the Court had given
credence to the felony limitation on Gideon,4 the Florida Su-
preme Court's handling of the analysis was certainly not anoma-
lous.8 The Court speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas said that
to analogize the right to counsel to the right to jury trial was
erroneous. The comparison of the genealogy of the two rights 6
shows differences distinct enough to prevent analogy. The histori-
cal argument, although appealing, is not the strongest justifica-
tion for construing the right to counsel as a more basic right than
the right to jury trial. The Court said there was no reason in the
language or logic of Gideon and Powell to limit the right to coun-
sel to their factual situations. The function of the right to jury
trial as an element of due process is only to guarantee that a
decision is based on the facts and decided by an impartial deci-
sion maker. There are other ways of safeguarding this result;
however, other elements of due process are not so easily substi-
tuted. The assistance of counsel secures fairness and makes the
other elements more than mere perfunctory rights.
The Court in Argersinger felt that if one sought to analogize
the right to counsel with decisions concerning other basic rights,
it is more accurate to analogize with other basic elements of due
process. 7 The length of the sentence has not affected the court's
84. See notes 31-35 supra.
85. Cf. James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969). Using analysis remarkably
similar to the Supreme Court's analysis in Argersinger, the Fifth Circuit interpreted
Gideon as broad enough to apply to all criminal offenses.
86. The Court compared the historical discussions of the right to jury trial in Duncan
and the right to counsel in Powell in concluding that to analogize these rights is erroneous.
As the Court stated in Duncan:
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him
an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased or eccentric judge . . . . The deep commitment
of the Nation to the right to jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense
against arbitrary law enforcement qualifies for protection under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the
states.
391 U.S. at 156. The history of the right to counsel was much different as noted by the
Court in Powell:
Originally, in England, a person charged with treason or felony was denied the
aid of counsel, except in respect of legal questions which the accused himself
might suggest. At the same time parties in civil suits and persons accused of
misdemeanors were entitled to the full assistance of counsel.
287 U.S. at 60.
87. In considering the sixth amendment guarantees other than jury trial and counsel,
the Court has drawn no felony-misdemeanor distinction. E.g., Washington v. Texas, 388
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interpretation of other sixth amendment rights except jury trial.
Therefore, should it be determinative in adjudication of the most
basic sixth amendment right? The Court felt that the amount of
sentence involved in no way made the legal and constitutional
issues any less complex;8 therefore, it should not be dispositive
of the right to counsel issue.
The Court in Argersinger took notice of the volume of misde-
meanor cases. This volume, rather than militate against the right
to counsel, would seem to be a factor in favor of recognizing this
right. The volume of cases places unbelievable pressures on the
system just to dispose of the cases.89 The Court felt that the only
bulwark against the tremendous pressure to plead guilty was the
attorney for the defendant.
There is a curious absence of equal protection analysis in
Argersinger despite the fact that the opinion was written by Mr.
Justice Douglas, author of Douglas v. California." Although
Gideon was void of equal protection analysis, there were probably
doctrinal reasons which explain its absence. The Court was anx-
ious to incorporate the sixth amendment into the fourteenth
amendment. Equal protection analysis would not have accom-
plished that goal; therefore, it was ignored. The explanation con-
cerning the absence of this analysis in Argersinger is not so easy.
One theory is that the nature of equal protection analysis is differ-
ent from the analysis involved in finding the existence of a sub-
stantive right." Thus the court is reluctant to use this egalitarian
approach unless it is the only choice available. 2
The concern for the availability of legal manpower per-
meated the concurring opinions. Mr. Justice Brennan was very
optimistic about the available legal resources while Mr. Justice
U.S. 14 (1967) (right to obtain witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)
(right to a speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right of confrontation);
and In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right of public trial).
88. See, e.g., Papachriston v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
89. Query: Does the assistance of counsel help a defendant to resist these pressures
or does counsel merely serve to expedite the system? See Blumberg, supra note 21.
90. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). This case used equal protection analysis to extend the right
of appointed counsel to indigent defendants on appeal.
91. See discussion of failure to use equal protection analysis in Gideon supra.
92. A less philosophical theory is that Mr. Justice Douglas could not have obtained
a majority vote for an opinion based on equal protection. This theory is buttressed by
looking to the entire Court's reaction to Douglas.
[Vol. 25
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Burger was skeptical. Justice Burger used a balancing test to
come to the same conclusion as the Court's holding. He noted the
strong state interest in limiting the right to counsel to serious
offenses; however, he concluded that the stronger countervailing
interest of the defendant outweighed the state's interest.
9 3
The most interesting opinion in Argersinger was written by
Mr. Justice Powell. The analysis used by Justice Powell is worth
more than mere academic perusal because the future of the right
to counsel seems to be foreshadowed in this opinion. Justice Pow-
ell cited the narrow interpretation of Gideon expressed by Mr.
Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in that case as justifying
the felony distinction in the right to counsel. Although agreeing
with the analysis used by the Court in Argersinger, Justice Powell
felt that the holding was too rigid and that the true analysis was
that the right to counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial. The
mechanistic approach offended him. His analysis is grounded in
fundamental fairness rather than immutable line-drawing. This
approach sounds like pre-incorporation language. He was also
concerned with the fact that the Court's holding "will extend the
right of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in cases where
the right to counsel would rarely be exercised by nonindigent
defendants."94 This reasoning might be applicable in an equal
protection argument, but it seems specious when analyzing the
meaning of the sixth amendment. The mere failure of nonindi-
gents to exercise their right is not a justification for denying that
right to indigents.
Just as the majority felt that the length of sentence should
not be the determinative factor in deciding the right to counsel,
Justice Powell questioned the logic of using the presence of a "jail
sentence" as the determinative factor." The detrimental effect on
93. Mr. Justice Burger, in defining the overriding interest of the defendant, said:
"There is little ground . . . to assume that a defendant unaided by counsel will be any
more able adequately to defend himself against lesser charges that may involve confine-
ment than more serious charges." 92 S. Ct. at 2014.
94. Id. at 2019.
95. Justice Powell felt that the simple test set forth by the Court would prove difficult
to implement. He also pointed to potential constitutional problems inherent in implemen-
tation of the rule. For example, could a new trial be held if after starting without counsel
it became apparent that a jail sentence would be imposed? Justice Powell felt a second
trial held for the purpose of affording the judge an opportunity to impose a harsher
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a defendant may be just as great or greater in a non-jail petty
offense.
Justice Powell proposed a rule more flexible than the Court's
rule to govern appointment of counsel. He felt that the determi-
nation of the right to appointed counsel should be made before
the indigent formally pleads. The Court would have to consider
the complexity of the issues and the severity of the sentence if the
defendant was convicted. This case-to-case consideration of the
individual factors peculiar to each case is like the special circum-
stances case in Betts. Justice Powell felt that the rule should be
implemented in this limited situation because the failure of the
rule was not a result of any inherent defect in its logic but rather
the failure of many state courts to live up to their responsibilities.
This "special circumstances" test could have particular viability
when the Court finally considers the right to appointed counsel
in non-jail petty offenses.
THE FUTURE: A RESURRECTION OF Betts?
After Kirby and Argersinger the right to counsel has taken
on new dimensions. As to the stages where the Supreme Court has
determined that there is a right to counsel, it is clear that with
the possible exception of non-jail petty offenses the distinction
between the right to retained counsel and the right to appointed
counsel is mooted. In situations where the Court has yet to extend
the right to retained or appointed counsel, the "critical stage"
test will be used to determine if it is part of the criminal prosecu-
tion. If the stage is determined to be critical, then there will be
no distinction made between retained and appointed counsel be-
cause of the Gideon, Douglas, and Argersinger analysis. The fu-
ture of the "critical stage" test, however, seems limited in light
of Kirby. In situations where the mechanistic Kirby test is not
applicable, the analysis will probably be a fundamental fairness
test. The application of this due process analysis will be on a case-
by-case basis much like the approach under the old Betts rule.
To best analyze the status of the right to counsel after these
changes, we should focus our attention on areas where the right
to counsel has yet to be extended. The two stages or situations
sentence would run afoul of the guarantee against being twice placed in jeopardy for the
same offense. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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chosen for examination in this paper are the grand jury proceed-
ing and the parol revocation proceeding. These two stages are on
the opposite ends of the continuum of our criminal justice system
and therefore should serve as good examples for demonstrating
the present status of the right to counsel analysis.
There is at present no recognized constitutional right to
counsel at a grand jury proceeding. If there is ever to be such a
right, the Supreme Court will have to find this right through one
of two ways. The Court will either determine that the grand jury
is a critical stage of the criminal prosecution or that the absence
of counsel at this proceeding is fundamentally unfair and viola-
tive of due process.
In applying the critical stage analysis the Court must first
look to the nature of the proceedings and its effect on the outcome
of the case. The grand jury is a unique institution of Anglo-
American historical origins.98 Over the years the use of the grand
jury has diminished probably because of statutory enactments or
constitutional provisions in many states making the grand jury
an optional stage. A changing role has come with this diminished
use. The grand jury has shifted away from an independent inves-
tigative body towards becoming a ritualistic part of the accusa-
tory process. In the case of most modem grand juries the prosecu-
tor commonly helps organize the daily work and serves as its legal
counsellor. Thus the grand juries usually review the evidence as
gathered and presented by the prosecutor's office. As originally
conceived, the grand jury can be one of the most critical stages
of the criminal prosecution because it represents the defendant's
last opportunity to be screened out of the system before trial. In
addition to the nature of the grand jury, the manner in which the
proceeding is conducted can be prejudicial to the defendant. All
of the testimony given at this proceeding is under oath and can
be stenographically recorded. The prosecutor is free to interro-
gate, cross-examine, discredit, or magnify testimony completely
unfettered by the rules of evidence. Although an accused's right
against self-incrimination follows him into the grand jury room,
the Supreme Court recognized in Escobedo and Miranda how
empty this right can be without the presence of counsel. A person
without counsel at his side could unwittingly offer decisive testi-
96. For a concise history of the grand jury system, see Kaufman, The Grand Jury-Its
Role and Its Power, 17 F.R.D. 331 (1955).
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mony to the grand jury even though he might have avoided the
disclosure if he had understood his privilege. The adverse effect
can go beyond the indictment. Recorded grand jury testimony is
always available to the prosecution, and it would seem to be
particularly useful in impeaching a witness whose testimony at
the trial is inconsistent with his prior testimony before the grand
jury. There would seem to be no end to the various uses which
can be made of the grand jury proceeding by a reasonably imagi-
native prosecutor. The grand jury must be characterized as an
anomaly in the system of criminal prosecution, for it is a stage
with all of the inherently prejudicial features that make other
stages critical yet the right to counsel has not been extended to
it. Obviously the first part of the analysis is satisfied. The pro-
ceedings most definitely can have a lasting influence on the result
of the criminal case.
The second step is to determine if the presence of a lawyer
would serve to mitigate or avoid potential prejudice. The princi-
pal question to be asked is what unique functions could an attor-
ney perform if he were present. The attorney, as mentioned ear-
lier, would make the right against self-incrimination the viable
protection the framers of the Constitution intended it to be. He
could observe and attempt to prevent or at least record unfair
practices such as using the proceeding to circumvent the spirit of
Miranda or Wade. The attorney could use the proceeding as a
discovery tool for the defense. This could be very important since
the preliminary hearing functions as a de facto discovery device
for alert defense attorneys and the rendering of an indictment by
a grand jury vitiates the accused's right to a preliminary hearing.
The attorney could serve these and many other valuable func-
tions in the grand jury proceeding. The state asserts that the
presence of an attorney would disrupt the traditional order and
format of the proceedings. If this is true, should the accused be
denied a right to counsel for that reason? Logic would seem to
require the answer to be no. Rules of procedure could prevent the
proceeding from becoming adversarial by limiting the role of the
attorney.
Although the grand jury proceeding would seem to satisfy
both elements of the "critical stage" test, the recent limitations
placed on that test by Kirby make the likelihood of its application
to grand juries very unlikely. This observation is by no means
axiomatic. The holding in Kirby, although it refused to extend
[Vol. 25
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the factual holding in Wade, is still broad enough to encompass
grand jury proceedings. This inclusion could be accomplished by
limiting Kirby to its facts. However, this limitation does not seem
to be a likely prospect given the Supreme Court's past treatment
of the grand jury situation. In In re Groban"7 the Court, in making
liberal allusions to grand jury proceedings, said:
Obviously in these situations [grand jury proceedings] evi-
dence obtained may possibly lay a witness open to criminal
charges. When such charges are made in a criminal proceeding,
he then may demand the presence of his counsel for his defense.
Until then his protection is the privilege against self-
incrimination.98
The Court's reasoning seemed to be based on the assumption that
the opportunity to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination
obviated any need for the presence of counsel. This reasoning
would seem unfounded because the pressures involved in a grand
jury interrogation are similar to the pressures involved in cus-
todial interrogation.' This attitude makes the prospect of the
Court attempting to slip grand jury proceedings into the opening
between Kirby and Wade seem unlikely.
The other form of analysis which might result in the exten-
sion of the right to counsel to the grand jury proceeding is the
"fundamental fairness" test for determining due process. This
type of analysis may once again come into vogue. Mr. Justice
Powell's concurring opinion in Argersinger mentions the resurrec-
tion of a test similar to the Betts "special circumstances" test
which was a species of the "fundamental fairness" test. However
likely the prospects for this test seem to be in other areas, the
Supreme Court's attitude toward what process is due in a grand
jury proceeding would seem to doom the application of this test
97. 352 U.S. 330 (1957). This case actually involved a fire marshal's inquest, not a
grand jury proceeding.
98. Id. at 333.
99. Additionally, is it not possible for a person to unknowingly incriminate himself
at this stage by answering a series of seemingly innocuous questions?
100. In Miranda, the Court said:
Even preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly
overcome by the secret interrogation process. Thus the need for counsel to pro-
tect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult
with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present at any ques-
tioning if the defendant so desires.
384 U.S. at 470.
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in this area. In Jenkins v. McKeithen,1'0 a case deciding the con-
stitutionality of a Louisiana statute that created the Labor-
Management Commission of Inquiry, the Court made its position
on grand jury proceedings clear. While holding that all the re-
quirements of due process were applicable to the hearing by the
Commission, the Court said:
We do not mean to say that this same analysis applies to every-
body who has an accusatory function. The grand jury, for exam-
ple, need not provide all the procedural guarantees alleged by
appellant to be applicable to the Commission. As this Court
noted [in past cases] "the grand jury merely investigates and
reports. It does not try." Moreover, "[t]he functions of that
institution and its constitutional prerogatives are rooted in long
centuries of Anglo-American history."'' °
The Court regards the grand jury as a unique institution and
seems certain to continue to defy objective application of their
own analysis in refusing to extend the right to counsel in this
situation.
The right to counsel at probation revocation as recognized by
the Supreme Court in Mempa has not been extended to parole
revocation. The analysis involved in this situation is somewhat
different from the approach to grand jury proceedings. Some
states allow retained counsel to appear for the parolee; however,
they refuse to appoint counsel for indigents. In this situation the
most obvious approach is an equal protection analysis. This ap-
proach can have its pitfalls if there is no recognized constitutional
right to retained counsel in this situation as evidenced by the
experience in the Tenth Circuit. In Earnest v. Willingham10 3 the
circuit court held that if a parolee is permitted retained counsel
at revocation hearings, the equal protection clause required that
counsel also be provided for indigent parolees. The danger in
using equal protection analysis where the right denied does not
have a basis as a constitutional right was graphically illustrated
in Fiskins v. Colorado.'"4 In this case the Tenth Circuit refused
to hold that the barring of counsel from the revocation hearings
altogether was violative of due process. The Supreme Court of
101. 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
102. Id. at 430 (citations omitted).
103. 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969).
104. 434 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir. 1970).
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Idaho' 5 refused to extend Mempa or Douglas to require the ap-
pointment of counsel for indigent parolees facing a revocation of
their parole. The Idaho court looked to Mr. Justice Harlan's dis-
senting opinion in Douglas for justification where he said:
[T]he state may have a moral obligation to eliminate the evils
of poverty, but it is not required by the Equal Protection Clause
to give to some whatever others can afford.' 6
The most viable approach to the right to counsel in parolee
revocation would seem to be the "fundamental fairness" test for
due process. The Fourth Circuit,"7 although refusing to extend
Mempa to parole revocations, adopted the empirical "special cir-
cumstances" rule of Betts. The test is whether the fairness of the
proceeding would be impaired by the absence of counsel:
We presently adopt the empirical rule . . . fully aware that in
adopting a case-by-case approach articulation of where the line
should be drawn between those who should have been supplied
with counsel and those lawfully refused such assistance is a most
difficult undertaking. That Betts proved unworkable after 21
years of experimentation. . . does not mean, we think, that its
rationale cannot be reasonably satisfactory in the administra-
tive as opposed to the judicial context."'
This sounds like Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in
Argersinger. One Second Circuit case0 ' has held that the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause does require that par-
olees facing revocation have the right to appointed counsel. The
court based its decision on Mempa and Goldberg v. Kelly."10
While noting that most of the circuit cases to the contra were
based on the right-privilege distinction that was destroyed by
Goldberg, the circuit court felt that it was incontestible that sub-
stantial rights affected in this situation gave rise to a right to
counsel.
105. Heath v. State, 94 Idaho 101, 482 P.2d 76 (1971).
106. 372 U.S. at 362.
107. Bearden v. South Carolina, 443 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1971).
108. Id. at 1095.
109. Bey v. Board of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971).
110. 397 U.S. 245 (1970). This case held that a constitutional challenge to procedures
preceding a state's withdrawal of welfare benefits cannot be answered by an argument that
public assistance benefits are a privilege and not a right.
1973]
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The Supreme Court has applied the concept of due process
to a parole revocation hearing in Morrissey v. Brewer." The
Court explicitly reserved the question of whether the parolee is
entitled to the assistance of retained counsel or appointed counsel
if he is indigent.12 Mr. Justice Brennan disagreed with the
Court's assessment of the counsel issue. He believes that
Goldberg plainly dictates that the parolee must be allowed to
retain counsel if he so desires. "The only question open under our
precedent is whether counsel must be furnished the parolee if he
is indigent."" 3 This is where the revival of the "special circum-
stances" analysis could come into use. By interpreting Goldberg
as requiring the right to appointed counsel in parole revocation
hearings, the Court would be faced with determining the right to
appointed counsel in this situation. In light of the spirit of Gideon
and Mempa, the Court could not completely turn its back on
indigent parolees; however, several members of the Court have
already expressed their dissatisfaction with a blanket rule. The
alternative seems to be the piecemeal "special circumstances"
test which would look to the individual case before deciding if
there was a right to counsel. If the Court refuses to extend
Goldberg into the parole revocation hearing, then possibly the
Court might be persuaded to apply an adulterated "special cir-
cumstances" test to the right to counsel in general. This may be
the Supreme Court's analysis of the future for the right to counsel
in parole revocation proceedings.
At one time the "critical stage" test seemed very viable while
the "special circumstances" test seemed dead. These roles are
almost reversed now. The "critical stage" test is not dead but it
is most certainly stultified. The "special circumstances" test sim-
ilar to the old Betts rule is not fully alive but that trend seems to
be developing. All of this leaves the past and present of the right
to counsel in well-defined compartments; however, the future of
the extension of the right seems uncertain at best. One thing does
seem certain. The right to counsel will not be one of the more
rapidly expanding constitutional rights in the future.
Richard A. Arnold
111. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
112. The Court said, "We begin with the proposition that the revocation of parole is
not part of the criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant
in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocation." 92 S. Ct. at 2600.
113. 92 S. Ct. at 2605.
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